Constitutional and legal grounds fiscal redistribution value added in the BRICS countries

The article is devoted to the formation of an effective system of tax and budgetary allocation of VAT, taking into account constitutional provisions that are fundamentally important for this area of relations. As a result of the study of this phenomenon using the example of the largest BRICS countries – China, India, Brazil – possible ways of interaction between the fiscal interests of the state center and the regions have been identified. Their generalization allows us to identify two extreme options: (1) complete regional centralization, in which the main tax and budget decisions are made by the central government; (2) partial regional decentralization, when it is possible to divide tax powers, provide independence in expenses, and create bodies for coordinating legal regulation between the center and the regions. It is concluded that the experience of organizing the fiscal distribution of VAT receipts in the BRICS countries can be productively applied to further improve such distribution as the most important financial and legal regulator of socio-economic development.